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RICO’s Extraterritoriality After Morrison:
Where Should We Go From Here?
Anneka Huntley*
In 2010 the Supreme Court addressed the extraterritorial application of U.S. securities
law in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., and held that U.S. laws could not be
applied to stocks bought and sold on foreign markets. The holding also invalidated the
“conduct and effects” test that lower courts had used to assess the extraterritoriality of
securities laws, and mandated that courts look to a statute’s focus to determine if
Congress intended the law to apply abroad. Prior to Morrison, courts had also used the
conduct and effects test to assess the extraterritorial application of the Racketeering
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). Since the Supreme Court’s
ruling, lower courts have struggled to identify RICO’s focus and formulate a new test
for the extraterritorial application of RICO. Three approaches have emerged: the
enterprise approach, the “predicate acts” approach, and the “pattern of activity”
approach.
This Note argues that the enterprise approach is the best approach. This Note
discusses the history of the conduct and effects test in RICO jurisprudence, the
landmark Supreme Court decision in Morrison, and the resulting lower court
confusion regarding extraterritorial applications of RICO. This Note then illuminates
the flaws in the predicate acts and pattern of activity approaches, and argues that the
enterprise approach is the clearest, most easily applicable approach and should thus
be adopted by lower courts.

* J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2014; B.A., Mills College, 2010. I
would like to thank Professor William Dodge for inspiring this Note, and the staff of the Hastings Law
Journal for their editorial advice, guidance, and feedback. Thank you to my amazing family and
friends, as well as Miles and Ella, for the years of love, support, and encouragement. Special thanks to
Markham for always being in my corner.
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Introduction
Securities law scholars widely considered the 2010 Supreme Court
ruling in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. to be game-changer
in American securities law jurisprudence.1 Less obvious at the time,
perhaps, was the upheaval the ruling would later cause in cases involving
the extraterritorial application of a completely different area of law: the
Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”).
RICO is a set of federal statutes designed to create criminal and civil
liability for the act of organizing a crime, even if the actor never took
part in the crime itself.2 RICO has clear domestic applications, but the
statute itself is silent as to any extraterritorial application. Before
1. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 560 U.S. 247 (2010). See, e.g., Elizabeth Cosenza, Paradise
Lost: § 10(b) after Morrison v. Australia National Bank, 11 Chi. J. Int’l L. 343 (2011); George T.
Conway III, Extraterritoriality’s Watchdog After Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 105 Am. Soc’y
Int’l L. Proc. 394 (2011); Genevieve Beyea, Morrison v. Australia National Bank and the Future of
Extraterritorial Application of the U.S. Securities Laws, 72 Ohio St. L.J. 537 (2011).
2. United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 439 (2d Cir. 1974).
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Morrison, courts had seemed to settle on the “conduct and effects” test
to determine when RICO could be applied to extraterritorial acts.3
Morrison specifically invalidated that test and the case holdings that
created the test.4 Because RICO jurisprudence borrows heavily from
securities jurisprudence, and it borrowed the conduct and effects test in
particular, the ruling in Morrison threw courts into turmoil over how to
apply RICO to enterprises and transactions that occur abroad. The
Morrison ruling also reaffirmed the longstanding presumption against
extraterritoriality.5 The presumption holds that statutes that do not say
they apply abroad will be assumed to have no foreign application.6
Accordingly, a statute will only have extraterritorial reach if Congress
specifically states that it intends for the statute to be applied to acts that
occur outside of the United States.7
RICO itself is silent as to its extraterritorial application. With the
conduct and effects test invalidated in Morrison, courts have struggled to
craft a test for determining the location of a RICO scheme (and thus,
determining whether U.S. courts have jurisdiction) that avoids any
foreign application. The Supreme Court’s ruling in Morrison mandates
that courts look to a statute’s “focus” to determine extraterritorial
application.8 The RICO statute names two foci: “enterprises” and
“patterns of activity.”9 A third focus on “predicate acts” has developed in
the case law.10 Thus, three approaches have emerged to assist courts in
determining the extraterritorial reach of RICO: (1) the enterprise
approach, using the location where defendants crafted the RICO
scheme; (2) the “predicate acts” approach, using the location of the acts;
and (3) the “pattern of activity” approach, considering the set of actions
as whole, including acts occurring abroad. The enterprise approach is
also sometimes coupled with the “nerve center” test, borrowed from
corporate law,11 which narrows the criteria for determining the location
of a RICO scheme to where the scheme is directed, controlled, and
coordinated.12

3. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 205 (2d Cir. 1968); Leasco Data Processing Equip.
Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1333–39 (2d Cir. 1972); Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Grp. PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 124
(2d Cir. 1995).
4. Morrison, 560 U.S. at 253–54.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 255.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 266.
9. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2012).
10. CGC Holding Co. v. Hutchens, 824 F. Supp. 2d 1193 (D. Colo. 2011).
11. European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., No. 02-CV-5771 NGG VVP, 2011 WL 843957, at *5
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2011).
12. Id. at *5–6.
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The Ninth Circuit adopted the pattern of activity approach in the
beginning of 2013.13 This is the only test adopted by an appellate court
thus far. However, it is also the least clear and the most difficult to apply
by lower courts. The pattern of activity approach ignores the
presumption against extraterritoriality and crafts a test that instead
favors extraterritoriality more than any other test. However, the
predicate acts approach is similarly unworkable because it relies on a reframed version of the conduct and effects test invalidated in Morrison.
The predicate acts approach also ignores the presumption against
extraterritoriality. This Note argues that the enterprise approach is the
clearest and most easily applicable test for extraterritorial application of
RICO because it is the test most likely to produce predictable results, it
has wider support among the courts than any other test, and it is in
keeping with both the presumption against extraterritoriality and
Congress’s focus on domesticity in RICO schemes.
Part I of this Note addresses the extraterritorial application of
RICO before Morrison. Part II discusses the Supreme Court’s
invalidation of the conduct and effects test and the Court’s new emphasis
on the focus of federal statutes. Part III addresses judicial attempts to
craft a new test for RICO extraterritoriality with the enterprise
approach, the predicate acts approach, and the Ninth Circuit’s pattern of
activity approach. Finally, Part IV explains why the enterprise approach
is the best of the three tests and should be adopted in the future.

I. Extraterritorial Application of RICO Before MORRISON
RICO is a federal law designed to punish the heads of criminal
organizations who order their subordinates to commit crimes.14 Before
the Supreme Court’s 2010 ruling in Morrison, most courts used a conduct
and effects test crafted by the Second Circuit to determine whether
American securities statutes could be applied to actions that occurred
abroad.15 Later courts considering RICO’s extraterritorial reach then
borrowed the conduct and effects test from securities jurisprudence and
applied it to RICO cases.16

13. United States v. Chao Fan Xu, 706 F.3d 965, 973 (9th Cir. 2013).
14. United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 439 (2d Cir. 1974).
15. Poulos v. Caesars World, Inc., 379 F.3d 654, 663 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he tests used to assess the
extraterritorial application of the securities laws provide useful guidelines for evaluating whether the
jurisdictional minimum exists . . . .”); see, e.g., SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 116 (3d Cir. 1977); Kauthar
SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 667 (7th Cir. 1998); Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 712 F.2d 421,
424–25 (9th Cir. 1983); Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
16. See N. S. Fin. Corp. v. Al-Turki, 100 F.3d 1046, 1051 (2d Cir. 1996); Poulos, 379 F.3d at 663;
Liquidation Comm’n of Banco Intercontinental, S.A. v. Renta, 530 F.3d 1339, 1351–52 (11th Cir.
2008); Robinson v. TCI/U.S. W. Commc’n Inc., 117 F.3d 900, 902 (5th Cir. 1997).
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A. A Note on the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act
Congress originally passed RICO in 1970 to target and punish the
leaders of criminal organizations who ordered crimes to be committed
but never took part in the crimes themselves.17 RICO prohibits
“patterns”18 of criminal activity and criminalizes a specific and
articulated set of actions, with a special focus on organized crime.19 In
order for crimes to be punishable under RICO, the offender must
commit at least two crimes from RICO’s defined list of thirty-five crimes,
and the crimes must form a pattern of activity.20 In other words, two
unrelated or sporadic criminal acts do not fall under the RICO
umbrella.21 RICO further requires that the crimes be committed as part
of an “enterprise,”22 meaning an “individual, partnership, corporation,
[or] any union or group of individuals”23 that share a common purpose
and at least some continuity of structure or personnel.24 Because
Congress mandated that RICO’s terms be “construed liberally,”25 courts
have considerable leeway to interpret the meaning of the word
“enterprise” and have held that a broad variety of associations qualify as
enterprises under RICO.26 RICO’s drafters originally intended the act to
be used to punish mob bosses, but it has been used expansively to pursue
other organizations—such as the tobacco industry,27 the Catholic Church

17. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2012); Parness, 503 F.2d at 439.
18. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (2012).
19. United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1358 (7th Cir. 1974).
20. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1962 (2012). The prohibited activities list includes crimes such as murder,
robbery, theft, extortion, embezzlement, counterfeiting, money laundering, drug trafficking, and fraud,
and receiving any income or profits from any of those acts. Id. In order to form a pattern of activity,
the acts must also be related in some way and must establish a threat of continuing activity; thus, the
courts look to the factor of “continuity plus relationship” in the acts. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,
473 U.S. 479, 528 (1985)
21. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n.14; H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989).
22. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(a)–(c) (2012).
23. Id. § 1961(4).
24. Simon v. Value Behavioral Health, Inc., 208 F.3d 1073, 1083 (9th Cir. 2000).
25. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 942.
26. See, e.g., United States v. Tocco, 200 F.3d 401, 425 (6th Cir. 2000) (Cosa Nostra organized
crime family); United States v. Torres, 191 F.3d 799, 807 (7th Cir. 1999) (enforcers in a street gang who
collected drug debts); United States v. Richardson, 167 F.3d 621, 625 (group of armed robbers
convicted of a series of assaults and robberies); Handeen v. Lemaire, 112 F.3d 1339, 1353 (8th Cir.
1997) (defendant’s bankruptcy estate that defendant attempted to use to defraud his judgment
creditor); United States v. Qaoud, 777 F.2d 1105, 1116 (6th Cir. 1985) (judge and bag-men who
organized kickbacks for judicial favors); United States v. Mazzei, 700 F.2d 85, 88 (2d Cir.
1983) (college basketball game fixers).
27. United States v. Philip Morris, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 131, 134 (D.D.C. 2000).
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in its child sexual abuse scandal,28 and pro-life organizations that
physically blocked access to abortion clinics.29
Nothing in the text of RICO states whether Congress intended the
statute to have extraterritorial application—that is, whether RICO
applies to acts or conduct occurring outside of the United States.30 The
Supreme Court has made clear that where there is no express
extraterritorial intent in the text of a statute, lower courts are to construe
the statute as having no extraterritorial effect.31 According to the Court,
if Congress intends a U.S. law to apply extraterritorially, it must say so
explicitly; otherwise, the statute will only be applicable to acts occurring
in the United States.32 If Congress states that a law applies outside the
United States, courts will apply that law according to its terms, even
when the law violates international law.33 However, “[i]t is a
longstanding principle of American law ‘that legislation of Congress,
unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States.’”34 As the Supreme Court
asserted in Morrison, “[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an
extraterritorial application, it has none.”35
B. The Conduct and Effects Test
Before the Supreme Court’s 2010 ruling in Morrison, courts
determined RICO’s extraterritorial reach differently.36 Some courts held
that RICO was not applicable extraterritorially at all.37 A majority of

28. Hall v. Tressic, 381 F. Supp. 2d 101 (N.D.N.Y. 2005); Amended Complaint, Hoatson v. N.Y.
Archdiocese, No. 05-CV-10467, 2006 WL 548198 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2006); Herakovic v. Catholic
Diocese of Cleveland, No. 85467, 2005 WL 3007145 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 10, 2005); Doe v.
Archdiocese of Cincinnati, 852 N.E.2d 157 (Ohio 2004).
29. Nat’l Org. for Women v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249 (1994).
30. N. S. Fin. Corp. v. Al-Turki, 100 F.3d 1046, 1051 (2d Cir. 1996).
31. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 560 U.S. 247, 255 (2010).
32. E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
33. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804) (“[A]n act of Congress ought
never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains . . . .”);
The Nereide, 13 U.S. 388, 421 (1815) (U.S. courts are bound by the “law of nations” unless the
government “manifests its will” to disregard them “by passing an act of Congress.”). For a concise
discussion of how the two concepts relate to each other, see United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 93
(2d Cir. 2003).
34. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248 (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 284 (1949)).
35. Morrison, 560 U.S. at 255.
36. Compare Jose v. M/V Fir Grove, 801 F. Supp. 349, 357 (D. Or. 1991) (“[T]he presumption
against extraterritorial application of federal statutes has not been overcome by clearly expressed
congressional intent within the RICO statutes or legislative history.”), with United States v. Noriega,
746 F. Supp. 1506, 1517 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (“The Act thus permits no inference that it was intended to
apply only to conduct within the United States. Such a narrow construction would frustrate RICO’s
purpose . . . .”).
37. M/V Fir Grove, 801 F. Supp. at 357.
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courts that considered the issue, however, applied a “conduct and
effects” test borrowed from securities jurisprudence.38
The conduct and effects test was crafted by the Second Circuit, first
as two distinct tests in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook39 and Leasco Data
Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell,40 which were later combined in
Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Group PLC.41 The test was then imported into RICO
jurisprudence in the Second Circuit in North South Finance Corp. v. AlTurki,42 in the Ninth Circuit in Poulos v. Caesars World Inc.,43 and in the
Eleventh Circuit in Liquidation Commission of Banco Intercontinental
SA v. Renta.44

1. The Conduct and Effects Tests in the Second Circuit’s Securities
Jurisprudence
In the second half of the twentieth century, the Second Circuit
developed two distinct conducts and effects tests in two groundbreaking
cases.45 The Second Circuit later combined these tests into one new
test.46 Because of its clarity and ease of use, the Second Circuit and other
courts used the new test to assess the extraterritorial reach of American
securities law.
In 1968, the Second Circuit held in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook that
the Securities Exchange Act (“SEA”) could be applied to foreign
transactions if the effect of those transactions was felt in the United
States.47 In Schoenbaum, the court considered a claim under section
10(b) of the SEA that American shareholders were defrauded during an
international sale of stock in a Canadian company.48 The court held that

38. N. S. Fin. Corp. v. Al-Turki, 100 F.3d 1046, 1052 (2d Cir. 1996) (considering the new test, but
ultimately choosing not apply it); Liquidation Comm’n of Banco Intercontinental, S.A. v. Renta, 530
F.3d 1339, 1351–52 (11th Cir. 2008) (applying the conduct test to a Florida businessman’s fraud
perpetrated against a Dominican bank); Poulos v. Caesars World, Inc., 379 F.3d 654, 663 (9th Cir.
2004) (applying the conduct and effects test to casinos aboard cruise ships in international waters);
Robinson v. TCI/U.S. W. Commc’ns Inc., 117 F.3d 900, 902 (5th Cir. 1997) (applying conduct test to
American company’s claim that it was defrauded during the sale of an English company); Adhikari v.
Daoud & Partners, 697 F. Supp. 2d 674, 689 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (applying the conduct and effects test to
a human trafficking scheme).
39. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 205 (2d Cir. 1968).
40. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1333–39 (2d Cir. 1972).
41. Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Grp. PLC, 54 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 1995).
42. Al-Turki, 100 F.3d at 1052.
43. Poulos, 379 F.3d at 663.
44. Renta, 530 F.3d at 1351–52.
45. Leasco, 468 F.3d at 1333–39 (establishing the conduct test for extraterritorial application of
RICO; if the conduct occurred in the United States, U.S. law applied); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405
F.2d 200, 208–09 (2d Cir. 1972) (establishing the effects test for extraterritorial application of RICO; if
the effects were felt in the United States, U.S. law applied).
46. Itoba, 54 F.3d at 122.
47. Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 206.
48. Id. at 205–06.
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the presumption against extraterritoriality did not apply because the
Canadian company traded its stocks on the American stock exchange,
injuring American investors.49 U.S. securities law applied because the
investors felt the effects of the foreign transaction in the United States.50
In 1972, the Second Circuit held in Leasco Data Processing
Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell that American securities law applied if the
conduct in question occurred in the United States.51 There, the British
defendants allegedly committed fraud in the sale of shares of a British
company to a U.S.-based corporation.52 The court held that, although the
transaction occurred on a foreign stock exchange and the investors did
not feel any effects inside the United States, domestic law applied
because a substantial amount of the misrepresentations took place inside
the United States.53 Thus, if the misconduct occurs in the United States,
the behavior is subject to American law.54
In 1995, the Second Circuit expressly combined the two
aforementioned tests in Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Group PLC.55 The court
considered whether the SEA applied to fraud allegedly occurring during
the sale of shares of a British company, Lep, to other overseas
companies.56 Lep’s shares traded partly on British stock exchanges and
partly on NASDAQ,57 and U.S. citizens in Connecticut allegedly made
some of the misrepresentations.58 The court stated: “There is no
requirement that these two tests be applied separately and distinctly
from each other. Indeed, an admixture or combination of the two often
gives a better picture of whether there is sufficient United States
involvement to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by an American
court.”59 The court held that a “sufficient combination of ingredients of
the conduct and effects tests is present in the instant case to justify the
exercise of jurisdiction.”60 As the Supreme Court would later note in
Morrison, the combined conduct and effects test was not necessarily
“easy to administer” and sometimes resulted in uneven application.61
Despite this later observation, courts embraced the Second Circuit’s

49. Id. at 206.
50. Id.
51. Leasco, 468 F.3d at 1334–35.
52. Id. at 1330. The court left unresolved the question of whether the American company was, in
reality, owned and controlled by a Dutch company.
53. Id. at 1334–35.
54. Id.
55. Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Grp. PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 1995).
56. Id. at 120–21.
57. Id. at 120.
58. Id. at 121.
59. Id. at 122.
60. Id. at 124.
61. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 258 (2010).
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approach because it provided guidance in what was otherwise a very
difficult field.62

2. Lower Courts Apply the “Conduct and Effects” Test to RICO
Cases
As previously noted, RICO extraterritoriality jurisprudence
borrows heavily from securities law jurisprudence.63 Commentators have
noted that the tests used in SEA cases are easily transferable to RICO
cases because the nature and purpose of the two statutes are similar.64
Thus, RICO cases after Itoba attempted to borrow its combined conduct
and effects test. In 1996, the Second Circuit first considered the
combined conduct and effects tests in the RICO context in North South
Finance Corp. v. Al-Turki.65 In Al-Turki, the Second Circuit ultimately
sidestepped the issue, affirming the lower court’s dismissal of the
plaintiff’s claim on jurisdictional grounds without affirming the court’s
use of the conduct and effects test.66 According to the court, the
defendants in Al-Turki had decidedly attenuated links to the United
States, and the court declined to extend U.S. jurisdiction over them.67
The court noted the extremely unsettled nature of this area of the law:
“specifying the test for the extraterritorial application of RICO is
delicate work. That work has not been done, [and] we need not do it
now.”68
The Ninth Circuit used the conduct and effects test in the RICO
context in 2004 in Poulos v. Caesars World, Inc.69 There, the court
assessed whether RICO applied to a line of cruise ships—operating in

62. See SEC v. Berger, 322 F.3d 187, 192–93 (2d Cir. 2003); Alfadda v. Fenn, 935 F.2d 475, 478 (2d Cir.
1991); SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 113 (3d Cir. 1977); Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 667
(7th Cir. 1998); Cont’l Grain (Austl.) Pty. Ltd. v. Pac. Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 415 (8th Cir. 1979).
63. N. S. Fin. Corp. v. Al-Turki, 100 F.3d 1046, 1051 (2d Cir. 1996) (“Although there is little
caselaw in this circuit regarding the extraterritorial application of RICO, guidance is furnished by
precedents concerning subject matter jurisdiction for international securities transactions and antitrust
matters.” (citation omitted)).
64. Kristen Neller, Extraterritorial Application of RICO: Protecting U.S. Markets in a Global
Economy, 14 Mich. J. Int’l L. 357, 377 (1993) (“[T]he purpose behind the enactment of RICO is
comparable to that of Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Act. Congress adopted Rule 10b-5 to
combat securities fraud and protect American investors and the market as a whole, while RICO was
enacted to combat racketeering activity and protect American businesses and industry. For each
statute, the prohibited activity’s impact on the U.S. economy as a whole was the primary concern of
Congress.”); but cf. Al-Turki, 100 F.3d at 1052 (“We therefore do not assume that congressional intent
in enacting RICO justifies a similar approach to the statute’s foreign application.”).
65. Al-Turki, 100 F.3d at 1052.
66. Id. at 1052–53.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1052.
69. Poulos v. Caesars World, Inc., 379 F.3d 654, 663–64 (9th Cir. 2004). The Ninth Circuit also
used the conduct and effects test in Butte Mining PLC v. Smith, 76 F.3d 287, 292 (9th Cir. 1996), and
Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 961 (9th Cir. 2002).
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both U.S. and international waters—that had been accused of RICO
violations in their onboard casinos.70 The court held that RICO applied
because the activities of the defendants took place substantially within
the United States, and affected U.S. citizens and commerce.71 After the
Supreme Court abrogated the conduct and effects test used in
Schoenbaum, Leasco, and Itoba with its Morrison decision, the Ninth
Circuit crafted a new and confusing test for the extraterritorial
application of RICO that will be difficult for lower courts to apply.72
More recently, in 2008, the Eleventh Circuit considered the conduct
and effects test in the RICO context in Liquidation Commission of
Banco Intercontinental SA v. Renta.73 The court considered the
extraterritoriality of RICO as a matter of first impression for that
Circuit.74 Borrowing from Al-Turki and Poulos, the Renta court stated
that RICO would apply extraterritorially “if conduct material to the
completion of the racketeering occurs in the United States, or if
significant effects of the racketeering are felt here.”75 The court held that
“[s]ignificant amounts” of the defendants’ conduct in “furtherance of the
RICO conspiracy,” though aimed at defrauding banks in the Dominican
Republic, had occurred inside the United States.76
A majority of courts that considered RICO’s extraterritoriality
before Morrison applied the conduct and effects test.77 Like the conduct
and effects test in securities law, the test provided some guidance in a
largely unsettled area of the law.78 Without this guidance, questions of
RICO’s extraterritoriality became muddy questions of policy.79

II. Supreme Court Jurisprudence Changes the Landscape of
RICO Extraterritoriality
The Supreme Court’s 2010 ruling in Morrison significantly changed
the landscape of SEA extraterritoriality jurisprudence. There, the Court
expressly abrogated the Second Circuit’s holdings in Schoenbaum,
Leasco, and Itoba,80 the three cases that created the combined conduct
70. Poulos, 379 F.3d at 663–64.
71. Id. The claim was dismissed on other grounds. Id. at 672.
72. See infra Part III.C.
73. Liquidation Comm’n of Banco Intercontinental, S.A. v. Renta, 530 F.3d 1339 (11th Cir. 2008).
74. Id. at 1351.
75. Id. at 1351–52.
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., Adhikari v. Daoud & Partners, 697 F. Supp. 2d 674, 689 (S.D. Tex. 2009); Renta, 530
F.3d at 1352; Poulos, 379 F.3d at 663; Robinson v. TCI/U.S. W. Commc’n Inc., 117 F.3d 900, 905 (5th
Cir. 1997); N. S. Fin. Corp. v. Al-Turki, 100 F.3d 1046, 1052 (2d Cir. 1996). A small number of courts
considering the issue chose not use the test. See Doe I v. State of Isr., 400 F. Supp. 2d 86, 114–16
(D.D.C. 2005); Jose v. M/V Fir Grove, 801 F. Supp. 349, 357 (D. Or. 1991).
78. Renta, 530 F.3d at 1531; Al-Turki, 100 F.3d at 1052.
79. Robinson, 117 F.3d at 907; Doe I, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 116; Jose, 801 F. Supp. at 354.
80. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 257–58, 266 (2010).
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and effects test used in securities jurisprudence.81 The Morrison ruling
created a new emphasis on the “focus” of a statute.82 Because RICO
cases also relied on the conduct and effects tests, the Morrison ruling
threw the tests for extraterritorial application of RICO into flux, forcing
courts to look to Congress’s “focus” in crafting RICO.
A. The Supreme Court’s Ruling and Emphasis on Focus in MORRISON
V. NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LTD.

In Morrison, the Supreme Court abrogated the tests previously used
in SEA extraterritoriality cases, instead mandating that courts look to
the focus of a statute when determining whether Congress intended the
law to apply to activities that occurred abroad. The Court considered the
extraterritorial reach of American securities law in a case concerning
fraud committed during the international sale of an American
company.83 National, an Australian bank, purchased Homeside Lending,
a U.S. company, to the eventual detriment of Australian shareholders of
National. Homeside was a mortgage service company based in Florida.84
Mortgage companies like Homeside can generate a substantial revenue
stream from mortgage service fees.85 The estimated value of that income
stream is dependent on how likely mortgagers are to pay off their loans
on or ahead of schedule.86 Homeside used income predictions from the
mortgage accounts it serviced to assess the value of the accounts, and in
turn to assess its own value as a company.87 When National purchased
Homeside in 1998, the estimated value of Homeside appeared in
National’s financial statements as well as in public statements made by
National, which its Australian shareholders used to make investing
decisions.88 In 2001, National announced that it was writing down89 the
value of Homeside by 2.2 billion dollars, causing the price of its stock to
fall.90

81. See Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.3d 1326, 1333–39 (2d Cir. 1972)
(establishing the conduct test for extraterritorial application of RICO); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405
F.2d 200, 208–09 (2d Cir. 1968) (establishing the effects test for extraterritorial application of RICO);
Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Grp. PLC, 54 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 1995) (expressly combining the two tests).
82. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266.
83. Id. at 251–52.
84. Id. at 251.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. A write down is a method of accounting where an asset’s book value is revised downward to
reflect a new market value less than the previous estimated book value. The amount by which a
company reduces the book value of an asset will be charged against its earnings as a loss or expense.
Black’s Law Dictionary 1609 (6th ed. 1990).
90. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 251–52.
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Petitioners, all Australian shareholders in National, brought a
complaint in U.S. court against Homeside and National.91 Petitioners
sued under section 10(b) of the SEA and SEC rule 10b-5,92 which
protects investors from fraud or misrepresentations made in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.93 The complaint alleged that
Homeside purposefully manipulated the financial models it used to
predict the likelihood of early mortgage payments, making the rates of
early repayment “unrealistically low” and inflating the total value of
Homeside Lending, and its parent company National.94 Thus, Homeside
and National allegedly lied to and defrauded its Australian investors.95
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the question of whether
American securities law covers fraud in transactions made on Australian
stock exchanges that harm only Australian shareholders.96
The Supreme Court held that the SEA only applies to stock
transactions on domestic exchanges and domestic transactions in other
securities.97 The Court first reaffirmed the presumption against
extraterritoriality,98 stressing Congress’s focus on domestic rather than
foreign affairs.99 Interpreting the text of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, the
Court concluded that nothing indicated that Congress meant them to
apply abroad.100 The Court then gutted the Second Circuit’s previous
securities jurisprudence.101 The Court stated that the circuit had
continually ignored the presumption against extraterritoriality, instead
presuming to “‘discern’ whether Congress would have wanted [its]
statute[s] to apply” in a given situation.102 The Court further stated that
the circuit “produced a collection of tests” for divining congressional
intent that are “complex in formulation and unpredictable in
application”103 and that this “demonstrate[d] the wisdom of the
presumption against extraterritoriality.”104 In particular, the Court
derided the Second Circuit’s conduct and effects tests (both separately
and combined),105 and the resulting extraterritorial application of U.S.
securities law to fraudulent schemes that occurred abroad, which other
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 252.
Id.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2010); 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (2014).
Morrison, 561 U.S. at 252.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 273.
Id. at 248 (“When a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none.”).
Id. at 260–61.
Id. at 248.
Id. at 255.
Id.
Id. at 255–56.
Id. at 261.
Id. at 257–58.
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circuits had subsequently followed.106 The Court stated, “[u]sing
congressional silence as a justification for judge-made rules violates the
traditional principle that silence means no extraterritorial application.”107
In response to petitioner’s argument that U.S. citizens made the
misrepresentations in the United States, the Court looked to the “focus”
of the SEA, which it stated was “not upon the place where the deception
originated, but upon purchases and sales of securities in the United
States,” essentially the securities transactions affected by the deceitful
conduct.108 Thus, “only transactions in securities listed on domestic
exchanges, and domestic transactions in other securities” fall under the
purview of the SEA.109 According to the Court, if the purchase and sale
of the affected securities is not in the United States, then the Exchange
Act does not apply.110 In this case, while the misrepresentations occurred
in Florida, the affected transactions took place abroad.111 Thus, because
the SEA’s focus is domestic, it did not apply.112 Accordingly, the Court
dismissed the claim.113
B. How the “Focus” Test Affects RICO Jurisprudence
The Court’s emphasis on Congress’s “focus” when crafting
legislation is not new,114 but the affirmation of the importance of
legislative focus has far reaching implications.115 The focus test requires a
court to determine a statute’s focus by deciding what Congress intended
the statute to accomplish when it created it.116 Before Morrison, the
Court looked at focus when assessing the extraterritoriality of U.S.
employment laws in E.E.O.C. v. Arabian American Oil Co.117 and
concluded that Congress meant for Title VII to have a “purely domestic
focus”; thus, it did not apply abroad.118 In the RICO context, courts were
forced to determine the congressionally intended focus of RICO.
However, RICO jurisprudence—and the consideration of RICO’s
106. Id. at 259.
107. Id. at 261; see John D. Kelly, Note, Let There Be Fraud (Abroad): A Proposal for A New

U.S. Jurisprudence With Regard to the Extraterritorial Application of the Anti-Fraud Provisions of
the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts, 28 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 477, 492–493 (1997).
108. Morrison, 560 U.S. at 266.
109. Id. at 267.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 251–53.
112. Id. at 273.
113. Id.
114. See E.E.O.C v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991); Foley Bros. Inc. v. Filardo, 336
U.S. 281, 283 (1949).
115. Patricia A. Leonard & Gerardo J. Rodriguez-Albizu, Do Extraterritorial RICO Claims Still
Exist in a Post-Morrison World?, 59 Fed. Law. 60, 60–61 (Oct./Nov. 2012).
116. Id.
117. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 255.
118. Id.
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extraterritoriality—has always borrowed heavily from securities
jurisprudence.119 As noted, courts generally used the conduct and effects
test.120 After Morrison, courts have struggled to craft a new test for
RICO applicability abroad. Any new test for RICO, according to
Morrison, must incorporate what Congress thought the focus of the law
was when they crafted it.121 Prior to Morrison, courts identified three
different, possibly overlapping, foci for RICO: the enterprise, the pattern
of activity, and organized crime.122
Section 1962 of the RICO statute names two foci: “enterprise[s]”
and “patterns of activity.”123 The Seventh Circuit, in United States v.
Neapolitan, stated that “[t]he central role of the concept of enterprise
under RICO cannot be overstated.”124 The Supreme Court seemed to
affirm the importance of a “pattern of activity” in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v.
Imrex Co., Inc.125 The Court reversed the lower court’s dismissal of the
plaintiff’s complaint and remanded the case, highlighting the need for
future plaintiffs to show a “pattern of racketeering activity.”126 In H.J.
Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., the Supreme Court also clearly
stated that RICO’s third focus is organized crime.127 The Court stated
that Congress enacted RICO due to “the perceived need to combat
organized crime,”128 and also noted that “although it had organized
crime as its focus, [it] was not limited in application to organized
crime.”129 As previously noted, no matter what Congress intended the
focus of RICO to be, the presumption against extraterritoriality still
applies because the statute is silent as to its extraterritorial application.130
A claimant will need to overcome that presumption for RICO ever to
apply to acts or effects felt abroad.

119. N. S. Fin. Corp. v. Al-Turki, 100 F.3d 1046, 1051 (2d Cir. 1996); Poulos v. Caesars World, Inc.,
379 F.3d 654, 663 (9th Cir. 2004); Neller, supra note 64, at 377–78.
120. See supra Part II.A.
121. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 560 U.S. 241, 266 (2010).
122. United States v. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489, 500 (7th Cir. 1986); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,
473 U.S. 479, 500 (1985); H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 237 (1989).
123. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2012).
124. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d at 500.
125. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 500.
126. Id.
127. See H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 237.
128. Id. at 248.
129. Id.
130. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 560 U.S. 241, 255 (2010).
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III. The Extraterritoriality of RICO After
the Ruling in MORRISON
U.S. district courts have struggled to determine the true focus of
RICO, and how it should be applied to acts and effects felt abroad.131
Courts have taken two approaches: the “enterprise” approach, and the
“predicate acts” approach. Both approaches leave RICO with almost no
extraterritorial application. The enterprise approach focuses on the
location of the enterprise, or where the “brains” of the operation are
located.132 The predicate acts approach focuses on where the defendants
carried out the acts and activities prohibited by RICO.133
A. The “Enterprise” Approach
The enterprise approach to the extraterritorial application of RICO
was crafted by a New York district court, and lower courts subsequently
applied the approach in Washington D.C., Florida, Pennsylvania, and
California. Shortly after the Supreme Court’s ruling in Morrison, the
Southern District of New York considered RICO’s extraterritoriality in
Cedeño v. Intech Group, Inc.134 The plaintiff, a Venezuelan citizen,
brought suit under RICO against a group of Venezuelan defendants,
alleging that they used U.S.-based banks in a money laundering scheme
to hold, move, and conceal the monetary fruits of fraud, extortion, and
private abuse of public authority.135 The scheme’s only connection with
the United States was the passing of funds through American banks.136
The court, specifically noting Morrison’s repudiation of the Second
Circuit’s conduct and effects test, looked to the focus of RICO to
determine whether Congress meant for it to apply abroad.137 The court
concluded that the focus of RICO is indeed on an enterprise of
racketeering activity, as “it is these [enterprises] that the statute labels
the ‘Prohibited activities.’”138 The court reasoned that the wording of the
statute does not “evidence any concern with foreign enterprises, let alone
a concern sufficiently clear to overcome the presumption against
extraterritoriality.”139 On appeal, the Second Circuit declined to
expressly endorse the enterprise-based reasoning, instead holding that
131. “It is unclear how Morrison’s logic, which evaluates the ‘focus’ of the relevant statute,
precisely translates to RICO.” In re Toyota Motor Corp., 785 F. Supp. 2d 883, 914 (C.D. Cal. 2011).
132. European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., No. 02-CV-5771 NGG VVP, 2011 WL 843957, at *5
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2011).
133. CGC Holding Co. v. Hutchens, 824 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1198–200 (D. Colo. 2011).
134. Cedeño v. Intech Grp., Inc., 733 F. Supp. 2d 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
135. Id. at 472 (internal citations omitted).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 473.
138. Id.
139. Id. Plaintiffs also attempted to make a “predicate acts” argument, which the court ultimately
rejected. Id. at 473–74.
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under either the enterprise or predicate acts test the result would have
been the same.140
Other courts, however, have adopted the New York District Court’s
enterprise-based reasoning.141 In 2011, the district court for the District
of Columbia adopted the enterprise approach in United States v. Philip
Morris.142 In a 2009 ruling before Morrison,143 the D.C. District Court
found a group of defendants liable for RICO violations for conspiring to
defraud American tobacco smokers, basing RICO liability on the
scheme’s “tremendous impact on the United States.”144 BATCo, a Welsh
tobacco company with its primary place of business in England, moved
for reconsideration, arguing that its case be considered separately in light
of the intervening ruling in Morrison.145 BATCo argued that Morrison
“rejected the ‘effects’ test for extraterritoriality, thereby invalidating the
basis for BATCo’s liability under RICO.”146
The Philip Morris court agreed that Morrison invalidated the court’s
previous holding.147 Looking to the extensive findings of fact in the
underlying case, the court noted that the facts showed that BATCo’s
enterprise was located abroad.148 Thus, Morrison invalidated the basis
for the previous ruling against BATCo, which relied on the effects test.149
Citing Cedeño, the court agreed that the text of the statute makes its
focus on enterprises clear.150
A California district court later followed this line of reasoning. The
District Court for the Central District of California, in In re Toyota
Motor Corp., considered the companion case to a large domestic multidistrict litigation brought following the highly publicized case dealing
with the unintended acceleration of certain Toyota vehicles.151 Foreign
plaintiffs brought suit alleging that the defendants had conspired to hide
information about the unintended acceleration from foreign buyers,
artificially inflating the value of their cars, and thus defrauded the foreign

140. Cedeño v. Castillo, 457 F. App’x 35, 38 (2d Cir. 2012).
141. See, e.g., United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 783 F. Supp. 2d 23 (D.D.C. 2011); In re
Toyota Motor Corp., 785 F. Supp. 2d 883 (C.D. Cal. 2011); Sorota v. Sosa, 842 F. Supp. 2d 1345 (S.D.
Fla. 2012); European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., No. 02-CV-5771 NGG VVP, 2011 WL 843957
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2011); In re Le-Nature’s, Inc., No. 9-1445, 2011 WL 2112533 (W.D. Pa. May 26,
2011); Aluminum Bahrain B.S.C. v. Alcoa, Inc., No. 8-299, 2012 WL 2093997 (W.D. Pa. June 11, 2012);
Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd. v. Seamaster Logistics, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d 933, 940 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
142. Philip Morris, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 28–29.
143. United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1, 43 (D.D.C. 2006).
144. Id. at 873.
145. Philip Morris, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 26.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 29.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. (citing Cedeño v. Intech Grp., Inc., 733 F. Supp. 2d 471, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)).
151. In re Toyota Motor Corp., 785 F. Supp. 2d 883 (C.D. Cal. 2011).
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buyers.152 The Toyota court looked to Cedeño and “agree[d] in principle
that ‘the focus of RICO is on the enterprise as the recipient of, or cover
for, a pattern of criminal activity.’”153
Interestingly, unlike the majority of other RICO extraterritoriality
cases, the defendants in Toyota were located in the United States.154 The
court ultimately determined that the plaintiffs lacked sufficient factual
allegations to invoke domestic RICO liability.155 However, the court left
open the possibility for future foreign plaintiffs to bring a domestic
RICO claim if they could adequately show that a domestic enterprise
had economic effects abroad.156 The court noted that even if every other
action occurred abroad (in this case, the “marketing, purchase, sale, or
lease of Toyota vehicles”157), plaintiffs could still bring a successful
RICO claim “as long as the enterprise, which engaged in a pattern of
racketeering activity, operated domestically.”158 Thus, a RICO scheme
planned out of the United States but put into effect internationally would
still be covered by RICO. While the holding conforms to Morrison’s
presumption against extraterritoriality, it leaves the door open for some
limited extraterritorial application of RICO. This limited extraterritorial
application would still be grounded in a domestic enterprise in keeping
with the ruling in Morrison.
In 2012, a Florida district court followed the enterprise approach in
Sorota v. Sosa.159 The court specifically abrogated its 2008 holding in
Liquidation Commission of Banco Intercontinental SA v. Renta because
of the intervening Morrison ruling.160 In Renta, the Eleventh Circuit had
applied the conduct and effects test to find RICO applicable to conduct
aimed at defrauding a Dominican bank.161 The district court ultimately
dismissed Sorota’s RICO claim: “The issue here is whether the
extraterritoriality holding of Renta has been overruled—or, more
accurately, undermined to the point of abrogation—by the Supreme
Court’s subsequent decision in Morrison . . . . Reluctantly, the Court

152. Id. at 897.
153. Id. at 914 (citing Cedeño, 733 F. Supp 2d at 474).
154. Id. at 896.
155. Id. at 914–15.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 915.
158. Id. (“[W]ere foreign Plaintiffs to bring a RICO claim against an alleged enterprise operating
in the United States, consisting largely of domestic ‘persons,’ engaging in a pattern of racketeering
activity in the United States, and damaging Plaintiffs abroad, these foreign Plaintiffs might well state a
claim consistent with Morrison’s holding.”)
159. Sorota v. Sosa, 842 F. Supp. 2d 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2012).
160. Id. at 1349.
161. Liquidation Comm’n of Banco Intercontinental, S.A. v. Renta, 530 F.3d 1339, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008).
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concludes that it has.”162 Following in the footsteps of Cedeño, Philip
Morris, and Toyota, the court concluded that the focus of RICO was the
enterprise, which in this case, was located in Peru.163 Citing those cases,
the court further agreed RICO does not apply extraterritorially164 and
dismissed Sorota’s claim.
The enterprise approach crafted in Cedeño was made easier to
apply with the addition of the “nerve center” test borrowed from
corporate law.165 In European Community v. RJR Nabisco Inc., another
New York district court held that the focus of RICO is on the enterprise,
but noted the difficulty of determining the location of an enterprise.166
The court then applied a nerve center test for determining the location of
a RICO enterprise, a test borrowed from Supreme Court jurisprudence
on determining the location of a corporation.167 The nerve center test
focuses on the “brains” of the operation; the enterprise’s location is
where the decisions effectuating the scheme are made.168 The addition of
the nerve center test makes determining the location of an enterprise
simpler. Additionally, the enterprise test has enjoyed support from other
commentators because of its clarity and the ease with which lower courts
can apply it.169
The only circuit court to apply anything like an enterprise test was
the Second Circuit in Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc. That
court decided Norex just three months after the Supreme Court’s
decision in Morrison.170 Morrison essentially invalidated appellant’s
arguments on appeal. The Norex court sidestepped the issue of RICO’s
focus, holding that under any focus, RICO extraterritorial reach did not
cover the defendants.171

162. Sorota, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 1348–49 (internal citations omitted). Renta applied the conduct and
effects test and held that enough of the defendant’s conduct had occurred in the United States for
RICO to apply. Renta, 530 F.3d at 1352.
163. Sorota, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 1349–50.
164. Id. at 1349.
165. European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., No. 02-CV-5771 NGG VVP, 2011 WL 843957, at *5–6
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2011). The “enterprise” approach was also followed by a federal district court in
Pennsylvania. In re Le-Nature’s, Inc., 9-MC-162, 2011 WL 2112533, at *3 (W.D. Pa. May 26, 2011);
Aluminum Bahrain B.S.C. v. Alcoa, Inc., Civ. Action No. 8-299, 2012 WL 2093997, at *2–6 (W.D. Pa.
June 11, 2012). Additionally, the “enterprise” plus “nerve center” approach was followed by a California
federal court in O.S.K. Lines, Ltd. v. Seamaster Logistics, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d 933, 940 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
166. RJR Nabisco, 2011 WL 843957, at *5–6.
167. Id.
168. Id. at *6.
169. See, e.g., Leonard & Rodriguez-Albizu, supra note 115, at 63.
170. Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc., 631 F.3d 29, 33 (2d Cir. 2010).
171. Id.
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B. The Predicate Acts Approach
Two other court decisions since Morrison have determined that
RICO’s focus is not on “enterprises,” but is instead on the “predicate
acts” that form the pattern of racketeering activity. In CGC Holding Co.,
LLC v. Hutchens, the District of Colorado determined that RICO’s focus
was on the acts and conduct that made up the RICO scheme.172 The
Southern District of New York followed this approach in Chevron Corp.
v. Donziger because the court felt the new approach better exemplified
congressional intent in crafting RICO.173 However, some commentators
have called the predicate acts approach “merely a reincarnation of the
‘conducts’ and ‘effects’ test that the Supreme Court expressly rejected
in Morrison.”174
In CGC Holding Co., the court considered allegations that
Hutchens, a Canadian resident and citizen, had orchestrated a phony
loan scheme based in Canada to defraud American plaintiffs.175 The
plaintiffs brought RICO allegations in Colorado against the Canadian
defendants and the “loan” companies, and the defendants moved to
dismiss on the grounds that RICO has no extraterritorial applicability.176
The court agreed with the Cedeño line of cases that, “RICO
provides no indication of an extraterritorial application.”177 The court
disagreed, however, with the determination of the focus of RICO. The
court instead determined that RICO’s focus was on the predicate acts:
“The focus of the statute is the racketeering activity, i.e., to render
unlawful a pattern of domestic racketeering activity perpetrated by an
enterprise.”178 Although the enterprise was essentially organized and run
in Canada, the court determined that “the conduct of the enterprise
within the United States was a key to its success.”179 Thus, the Hutchens
court crafted a new test that looks not to the location of the enterprise,
but instead to where the predicate acts of racketeering occurred. The
court focused on the defendants’ conduct and effects that occurred in the
United States, essentially crafting a new test based on the rationale that
had already been rejected in Morrison.
In 2012, another court followed the faulty logic from Hutchens. In
Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, the same court that crafted the enterprise
test in Cedeño two years earlier rejected the enterprise-based reasoning
from that line of cases, instead following the “predicate acts” reasoning

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

CGC Holding Co. v. Hutchens, 824 F. Supp. 2d 1193 (D. Colo. 2011).
Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 871 F. Supp. 2d 229, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
Leonard & Rodriguez-Albizu, supra note 115, at 63.
CGC Holding Co., 824 F. Supp. 2d at 1200–01.
Id. at 1197.
Id. at 1208.
Id. at 1209 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 1210.
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from Hutchens.180 The court considered extraterritorial RICO claims
stemming from a massive judicial settlement against Chevron in
Ecuador.181 Chevron alleged that Steven Donziger, a New York lawyer
associated with the case, extorted and defrauded the company from his
New York office.182 Donziger moved to dismiss on the basis that it was
an impermissible attempt to apply RICO extraterritorially.183
The Donziger court was, of course, not bound by Cedeño, and no
appellate court above it had (nor has) weighed in on the correct test for
determining extraterritorial RICO claims. After examining the reasoning
used in Cedeño (and noting the other cases that followed it), the court
found that its emphasis on the domestic or foreign “enterprise” of a
RICO claim was not “persuasive or helpful” because only domestic
enterprises would be covered.184 The court focused on the perceived
inequality of applying RICO to domestic enterprises alone, leaving
international enterprises untouched.185 Applying the Hutchens
reasoning, the court concluded that RICO was unavailable because the
alleged predicate acts had occurred in the United States, and denied
Donziger’s motion to dismiss.186 The obvious flaw in the Donziger court’s
reasoning is the well-established presumption that Congress “ordinarily
legislates with domestic effect”; if Congress wishes its laws to have
foreign effect it must specifically say so.187 RICO has no such specific
intent, so courts must only apply RICO to domestic enterprises, leaving
foreign and international enterprises beyond RICO’s reach.

180. Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 871 F. Supp. 2d 229 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
181. Id. at 236.
182. Id. at 240 (Donziger was accused of “(1) bringing a lawsuit in Ecuador; (2) fabricating
(principally in the United States) evidence for use in that lawsuit in order to obtain an unwarranted
judgment there; (3) exerting pressure on Chevron to coerce it to pay money not only by means of the
Ecuadorian litigation and judgment, but also by subjecting Chevron to public attacks in the United
States and elsewhere based on false and misleading statements; (4) inducing U.S. public officials to
investigate Chevron; and (5) making false statements to U.S. courts and intimidating and tampering
with witnesses in U.S. court proceedings to cover up their improper activities.”).
183. Id. at 239.
184. Id. at 241.
185. Id. at 243.
186. Id. The “predicate acts” line of reasoning has been followed in at least two other cases. In
2012, an Illinois district court analyzed both the “enterprise” and “predicate acts” lines of cases in
Borich v. BP, P.L.C., and concluded that it was persuaded by the “predicate acts” reasoning.
904 F. Supp. 2d 855 (N.D. Ill. 2012). In 2013, in Republic of Iraq v. ABB AG, the Southern District of
New York—the same court that issued both the Cedeño and Donziger decisions—noted the inability
of the court to decide on the correct approach: “The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has
not yet determined the objects of the RICO statute’s solicitude . . . . The district judges in this Circuit
have not reached agreement on the issue, either.” Republic of Iraq v. ABB AG, 920 F. Supp. 2d 517,
544 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). The court ultimately declined to decide the issue, holding that under either
approach the plaintiffs were seeking an inappropriate extraterritorial application of RICO, and
dismissed the claim. Id. at 552.
187. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010).
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A minority of courts have rejected the enterprise approach, opting,
instead, to use a predicate acts approach that looks to the location of the
alleged acts and activities. This test is essentially a re-working of the
conduct and effects test, a test invalidated by Morrison. The Donziger
court based its reasoning on a flawed understanding of a basic concept of
statutory interpretation—the presumption against extraterritoriality. In
2013, the Ninth Circuit crafted a third approach.
C. The Ninth Circuit’s New Approach in UNITED STATES v. CHAO FAN

XU

In 2013, the Ninth Circuit identified a third method of interpreting
RICO’s extraterritorial application, focusing on the “pattern of
activity.”188 The test creates the possibility that RICO may be applicable
to some conduct that occurs abroad so long as enough of the acts in the
“pattern” occurred in the United States.189 In Chao Fan Xu, the court
considered a “multinational” RICO scheme aimed at defrauding
international banks, in which some conduct occurred in the United
States.190 The court focused on the defendant’s conduct as a whole,
regarding the entire set of actions as a “pattern” under RICO.191 This
ruling created a third approach, which only muddies the already unclear
waters of RICO’s extraterritorial effect.
In Chao Fan Xu, four Chinese nationals appealed their RICO
convictions for crimes committed as part of a scheme to defraud the
Bank of China.192 The four defendants were two couples who legally
married in China.193 The husbands were both managers at the Kaiping
sub-branch of the Bank of China.194 From 1994 to 2001, they allegedly
engaged in three types of fraud to funnel money out of the bank and into
a conduit company: foreign exchange speculation, out-of-book
unrecorded loans, and false loans.195 The fraudulent conduct resulted in a
total loss of around $420 million.196 According to the charges, the
defendants avoided detection by falsifying bank records, even though the
Chinese government audited the bank.197
To avoid Chinese law enforcement in the event the fraud was ever
discovered, all four defendants entered into allegedly false marriages

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

United States v. Chao Fan Xu, 706 F.3d 965, 977–78 (9th Cir. 2013).
Id. at 978.
Id. at 972–73.
Id. at 978–79.
Id. at 972.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 973.
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with American residents who held valid U.S. residency.198 The purpose
of the marriages was to gain U.S. passports and residency status because
China does not have an extradition treaty with the United States. As
such, the fraudulently acquired passports would aid the defendants in
avoiding prosecution in China.199 The defendants used their fraudulently
acquired passports to travel to the United States, where they funneled
their stolen funds through Las Vegas casinos and into personal accounts
for their own use at American banks.200
In 2001, when the Bank of China finally changed its accounting
procedures and discovered the fraud, the defendants fled to the United
States using their fraudulent passports and immigration status.201 Federal
officials arrested a fifth conspirator in Los Angeles who informed them
of the entirety of the scheme.202 The federal officials then arrested the
defendants in Kansas and Oklahoma in 2004 and eventually convicted
them of RICO conspiracy, money laundering conspiracy, conspiracy to
transport stolen money, and use of fraudulently obtained passports and
visas.203 The defendants appealed the conviction on the grounds that
their RICO convictions were invalid because their crimes were
committed in China and RICO cannot be applied extraterritorially.204
The defendants based their appeal on the theory that their enterprise
had two parts: part one, the conspiracy, which occurred in China; and
part two, the immigration fraud, which occurred in the United States.205
The court noted at the outset of its opinion that it was
“consider[ing] RICO’s application in a multinational context,”206 and
that it was necessary to determine whether RICO could be lawfully
applied to any, or all, of the defendant’s foreign conduct.207 The court
then turned to the tests crafted by previous courts. Looking at the
analysis in the Cedeño line of cases, the court acknowledged that the
cases “concluded that the focus of RICO is on the enterprise—
specifically, domestic enterprises.”208 The court also examined the “nerve
center” test used in European Community and Mitsui O.S.K. Lines
before rejecting it along with the enterprise approach because it targeted
only one aspect of the conspiracy.209

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 973–74.
Id. at 974.
Id. at 975.
Id. at 974.
Id.
Id. at 976.
Id. at 977.
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The Chao Fan Xu court addressed the “predicate acts that form a
pattern of racketeering activity” approach and found this approach to be
more convincing.210 However, the court focused more on the “pattern of
activity” language and ultimately settled on a new test.211 The court
looked to previous Supreme Court cases to determine that the focus of
RICO is the pattern of activity.212 The court also looked to RICO’s
legislative history and noted that Congress passed the law to impose new
sanctions on the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized
crime.213 The court determined that “it is highly unlikely that Congress
was unconcerned with the actions of foreign enterprises where those
actions violated the laws of this country while the defendants were in this
country.”214 Therefore, the court decided that it should look “at the
pattern of defendants’ racketeering activity taken as a whole.”215 This
reasoning ignores the presumption against extraterritoriality and chooses
to include foreign actions where the presumption should otherwise shut
them out.
In applying the pattern of activity test to this case, the court
reasoned that the entirety of the defendant’s action should be taken into
account:
The dual parts of Defendants’ enterprise were necessarily conjoined in
pursuit of that goal—i.e., to steal large sums of money from the Bank
of China and to get away with it in the United States. Defendants
intended to use the immigration fraud to consummate the purpose of
the enterprise: to acquire the money and safely enjoy it in the United
States, beyond the reach of Chinese law. Without the immigration
fraud, the bank fraud would have been a dangerous failure.216

Thus, while the court based its affirmation of the RICO conviction
on the defendant’s domestic immigration fraud, it considered the pattern
of activity as a whole, including predicate acts perpetrated abroad.217 The
court essentially affirmed that RICO has no extraterritorial application218
and then applied the law to a pattern of activity that took place
abroad.219 This created a new, entirely unnecessary approach that is
counter to the well-established presumption against extraterritoriality.
The new focus, while borrowing language from previous cases that used
the predicate acts approach, leaves more room for extraterritorial
210. Id. at 975–79.
211. Id.
212. Id.; see Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 154 (1987);
H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 236 (1989).
213. Chao Fan Xu, 706 F.3d at 978.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 978–79.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 978.
219. Id. at 979.
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applicability than the other two tests. If Congress wanted RICO to have
extraterritorial effect, it would (and is indeed required to) have
specifically stated so. The Ninth Circuit has attempted to circumvent
basic concepts in statutory interpretation and give RICO an
extraterritorial effect Congress never meant it to have.

IV. CEDEÑO’s “Enterprise” Approach is the Clearest and Most
Easily Applied Approach
The Ninth Circuit ruling unnecessarily muddied the waters of
RICO’s extraterritorial applicability. The ruling crafted a third possible
approach to RICO extraterritoriality, which will be difficult for lower
courts to apply. The enterprise approach crafted in Cedeño is a clearer
test that already enjoys a high level of support in the lower courts, and
should be adopted by appellate courts going forward.
The enterprise approach looks to the location of the RICO scheme,
where the “brains” of the operation were located. Coupled with the
nerve center test applied in European Community v. RJR Nabisco Inc.,
this approach cuts RICO’s extraterritorial application along clear lines:
RICO applies to enterprises located in the United States, but not to
enterprises located abroad. The predicate acts approach is simply a
reworking of the invalid conduct and effects test and is counter to the
presumption against extraterritoriality.
The major problem with the Chao Fan Xu ruling is the lack of
clarity concerning the line between domestic and foreign patterns of
activity.220 The Ninth Circuit would likely not have settled on a pattern of
activity approach if the contacts with the United States were significantly
less than they were in Chao Fan Xu, but the court provides no guidance
as to how much of the pattern of activity need take place in the United
States for a court to find that the entire pattern and predicate acts
occurred domestically. Under the Ninth Circuit’s test, courts will still be
able to find that some foreign acts constitute a pattern. What the court
left unclear, however, is how much of the activity must take place in, or
have a connection with, the United States for the entire pattern, foreign
acts included, to be considered domestic. This leaves courts in the Ninth
Circuit with a largely open-ended test likely to create wildly different
results in different courtrooms. The lack of a clear test in the Second
Circuit is similarly concerning, although far more courts in the Second
Circuit have endorsed the enterprise approach.
A better alternative is the enterprise test crafted in Cedeño. This
test focuses simply on the location of the enterprise, essentially where the

220. The Donziger court made a similar argument about the “enterprise” approach coupled with
the “nerve center” test, but this argument is unpersuasive because that court ignored the presumption
against extraterritoriality. See Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 871 F. Supp. 2d 229, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
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“brains” of the scheme are located.221 The approach is also consistent
with the presumption against extraterritoriality, as it only covers schemes
with enterprises located within the United States. It is clear that
Congress intended enterprises to be a focus of RICO, as enterprises are
listed in the very wording of the statute as an element of the crimes
covered.222 “Enterprises” are defined in the statute using the plain
meaning, but “patterns of activity” are only defined as requiring “two or
more acts” without any further clarification of what makes a “pattern.”223
The enterprise approach leaves no need to divine legislative intent any
further, as the courts using the predicate acts and pattern of activity
approaches have done. Additionally, the enterprise approach leaves the
statute with no, or almost no, extraterritorial application, which is in
keeping with the presumption against extraterritoriality and Congress’s
presumed focus on domestic affairs.224 Note that the Toyota court left
open the possibility for foreign plaintiffs to bring a successful RICO suit
if the enterprise is domestic but its effects are felt abroad.225 A foreign
plaintiff could bring an extraterritorial RICO claim if the scheme was
hatched in the United States but every other aspect occurred abroad.226
This possibility is still consistent with congressional intent that RICO
have domestic effect—a RICO enterprise planned in the United States
should be punishable under U.S. law. On the other hand, a foreign
enterprise should be beyond RICO’s reach.
One valid criticism of the enterprise approach is the difficulty of
determining the locus of the enterprise. However, the European
Community court provided a straightforward approach borrowed from
Supreme Court jurisprudence: the nerve center test.227 This test looks to
where the “brains” of an operation were located, as opposed to its
“brawn,” or where the acts were carried out.228 Because of district courts’
familiarity with the nerve center test, it should be relatively easy to
apply.229 Additionally, because of its clarity, the enterprise approach and
the nerve center test are likely to produce similar results across
jurisdictions, leading to relative stability in RICO extraterritoriality
jurisprudence.

221. See Hertz v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 95 (2010); European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., No. 02-CV5771 NGG VVP, 2011 WL 843957, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2011).
222. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)–(c) (2012).
223. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4)–(5) (2012).
224. See E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
225. In re Toyota Motor Corp., 785 F. Supp. 2d 883 (C.D. Cal. 2011).
226. Id.
227. European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., No. 02-CV-5771 NGG VVP, 2011 WL 843957, at *5–6
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2011); see Hertz v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 78 (2010).
228. RJR Nabisco, 2011 WL 843957, at *6.
229. See Hertz, 559 U.S. at 90.
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Conclusion
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison, courts
considering the extraterritorial reach of RICO borrowed the conduct and
effects test established by the Second Circuit securities jurisprudence.
The Morrison ruling expressly invalidated that test and mandated that
courts look to the “focus” of each statute to divine its extraterritorial
application. After Morrison, lower courts have struggled to apply the
Supreme Court’s reasoning to cases implicating extraterritorial
applications of RICO. Over the past several years, three foci for RICO
have emerged in determining RICO’s applicability to acts occurring
abroad: the location of the enterprise, predicate acts, and the pattern of
activity. Due to the weaknesses inherent in the predicate acts and pattern
of activity approaches, courts should apply the enterprise approach
moving forward.
The predicate acts approach is flawed because it is simply a
refabricated version of the conduct and effects test, which was
invalidated by Morrison. This approach also ignores the presumption
against extraterritoriality. Further, the test is designed to treat
enterprises that are located abroad and those that are located
domestically the same. That concept flies in the face of the presumption
because it gives an extraterritorial reach to RICO where Congress has
not specified that the statute should have any extraterritorial reach.
The pattern of activity approach is also flawed. It similarly ignores
the presumption against extraterritoriality by attempting to extend
RICO to multinational schemes where Congress has not given the statute
any international effect. Congress can mandate that its laws have
extraterritorial effect, but it has not done so with RICO. The pattern of
activity approach is an unnecessary version of an already flawed
predicate acts approach.
Future courts should adopt the enterprise test for RICO
extraterritoriality because it is the easiest approach for lower courts to
apply. The enterprise test creates clear lines for RICO’s extraterritorial
applicability: an enterprise located in the United States is covered, but an
enterprise located abroad is not. The addition of the nerve center test
makes locating the enterprise especially clear, as it requires courts to
engage in the common inquiry of where the brains of the scheme were
located—that is, where defendants made decisions and coordinated their
operation. The enterprise approach is also the test most likely to produce
predictable results because of its clarity, and it enjoys the widest amount
of support among courts. Lastly, the enterprise approach is consistent
with both the presumption against extraterritoriality and congressional
intent in passing RICO.

